Has investor protection been rendered obsolete by the Argentine crisis? by Mortimore, Michael & Stanley, Leonardo
15C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 8  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 6
HAS INVESTOR PROTECTION BEEN RENDERED OBSOLETE BY THE ARGENTINE CRISIS?  •  MICHAEL MORTIMORE AND LEONARDO STANLEY
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 8  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 6
Has investor protection
been rendered obsolete
by the Argentine crisis?
Michael Mortimore and Leonardo Stanley
Unlike the train of events in previous crises, when the negotiations
between the parties –creditors and debtors, investors and host countries–
were played out within some kind of institutional framework, the crisis of
2001 portrayed Argentina as a country abandoned to its fate, not just
once, but twice. But although investors had initially been able to alter the
rules in their favour to secure better protection and enhanced legal
certainty, ultimately they came out of the situation worse off. The Argentine
experience suggests that, as the influence of the international financial
institutions declines, asymmetric solutions cannot last and, at the end of
the day, democratic governments will put their electorate before their
investors. But is the Argentine case an exception to the rule or does it
reflect a more general weakening of foreign investment protection?
Michael Mortimore
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I
Introduction
Foreign investment has played a key role in the
Argentine economy in the last 30 years, especially in
the 1970s and the 1990s, when inflows reached highs
of 8% of GDP (see figure 1). These highs were associated
with three types of investor: first, in the 1970s,
transnational banks that extended large syndicated
loans; then, in the 1990s, with financial intermediaries
who lent voluminous sums in bonds and TNCs that made
heavy direct investments.
Notwithstanding this, on 23 December 2001
Argentina shook the international financial community
by announcing a default of over US$ 100 billion on its
public debt. The default involved more than 150
varieties of financial paper governed by eight different
jurisdictions. The magnitude of the default was obvious:
at the time, Argentina’s debt represented a quarter of
all debt traded in the emerging bonds market. At the
same time, in January 2002, the Argentine peso declined
to one third of its value and the Government “pesified”
public utility rates. This infringed the contracts signed
with TNCs operating in the country and prompted a
number of international lawsuits against Argentina
under the terms of bilateral investment agreements. The
Argentine case formed a landmark in modern financial
history, not only because of its sheer magnitude, but
also because it combined two different crises and
because of the institutional circumstances in which they
unfolded. In fact, the extremity of the debt crisis was
such that the balance tipped in the debtor’s favour. The
foreign direct investment (FDI) crisis, by contrast, had
long-term repercussions associated with the pattern of
investment in the sectors affected.
To start with, the Argentine case brought new twists
into the dispute between sovereign debtors and
creditors. Unlike what had occurred in the 1980s,
Argentina had more bargaining power in this financial
crisis, since at the time of the collapse its creditors
consisted of a dispersed and unorganized mass of
thousands of bondholders, rather than a small number
of strategically grouped transnational banks. Argentina
was not coerced into a renegotiation, therefore. This
was in addition to the misguided strategy of the
bondholders, who, anxious to limit their debtor’s
leverage, blocked all attempts at renegotiation. In the
Argentine case at least, this strategy ultimately
backfired. It was also clear that there was no institutional
framework, since the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
was unable to play a more significant role in the
renegotiation. Lastly, divisions within the Group of
Seven (G7) had a far from negligible influence on the
course of events. In the light of these last two factors,
Argentina could do no other than devise a solution of
its own.
With regard to the real sector, i.e., FDI in utilities,
the bilateral scheme for treatment of investment had
existed since the late 1950s, but did not become widely
used until the 1990s, which saw not only a large increase
in FDI flows to developing countries, but also the
establishment of international arbitration procedures.
Argentina soon became one of the most fervent
advocates of the bilateral scheme, signing more than
50 bilateral investment agreements and joining the
World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID).
The guarantees Argentina extended in contracts
with foreign direct investors, especially those with
interests in utility companies, gave those investors a
basis on which to sue the country after the declaration
of the economic emergency law. This began a process
that has cited Argentina in more than 40 lawsuits, which
alone account for almost 40% of cases outstanding
before ICSID, the main international institution for the
settlement of investment disputes between foreign
investors and host governments.
A number of authors have researched the causes
of the recent crises, but there is no consensus on the
trigger. Some blame the Argentine authorities for
adopting policies that ultimately led the country into a
crisis. Others suggest that creditors and investors were
incautious in choosing a capital investment location.
This paper seeks to spotlight a different aspect, however:
the role of the international financial institutions (IFIs).
Despite strong growth of flows of capital and FDI
in the 1990s, IFIs continued to be weak, irrelevant and
inconsistent. This being so, when crises occurred, the
The authors are grateful for comments by a judge who preferred
to remain anonymous. The opinions expressed in this paper are the
sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily coincide
with those of the organizations to which they belong.
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market option (financial system) or the bilateral
investment scheme tended to prevail, even though
neither offered lasting solutions.
The rest of this work addresses these two aspects,
looking at the way financial standards and rules on the
treatment of FDI have evolved. Argentina’s problems
are examined in the light of each of the conflicts the
country experienced when the Government dismantled
the convertibility scheme (fixed exchange-rate regime)
and, lastly, a number of considerations are set forth




1. Absence of the international financial system
In the 1970s, cracks began to appear in the financial
scheme that had emerged after the Bretton Woods
Conference (1944). Overflowing with liquidity thanks
to large, readily available deposits (eurodollars) and
strongly rising petroleum prices (petrodollars), the
transnational banks set out to find new clients, mainly in
newly independent and Latin American countries. In Latin
America, the wide availability of funds fuelled a new
model of growth. But despite the precautions of investors1
and the benefits the new model brought for borrowers,
the stage was set for a serious crisis, which broke out
in 1982.
After Argentina formally defaulted, there ensued
a wide-ranging debate on the framework of the
renegotiation. Divisions emerged between the
proponents of an institutional scheme and those in
favour of letting the market resolve the crisis
(Eichengreen, 1988). Thus, the crisis evolved in three
stages. First, the transnational banks attempted to lever
all the costs onto the debtor countries in the form of
1 Contracts for loans extended from the United Kingdom and the
United States imposed a sovereignty waiver in the event of a dispute,
among other clauses. The creditors believed that this strategy would
make a default impossible.
FIGURE 1









Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of World Bank data (2004).
Portfolio investment Syndicated loans FDI (TNCs)
(bonds and shares) (transnational banks)
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restructuring loans, which entailed extremely high
commissions and interest and stringent economic
conditionalities imposed by IMF. Second, IFIs set forth a
restructuring programme aimed at helping the debtor
countries to deal with the debt burden, requiring the
transnational banks to lend more. Following the banks’
refusal, there was a third stage in which the United
States Treasury Department provided more active
support through mechanisms to reduce the value of the
debt (Brady bonds, debt-for-capital swaps, and so
forth). Thus, separately from the debate, the debt
restructuring process developed into essentially a
private matter with an asymmetric outome in which the
debtors shouldered the heavier share of the adjustment
burden. This lasted until it became clear that the crisis
would not be worked out unless the debt was reduced
and some of the adjustment costs shifted to the main
creditors. Unfortunately, it took about 10 years for this
conclusion to be reached (Mortimore, 1989; UNCTC,
1990; ECLAC, 1989).
By the early 1990s the situation had changed again.
With the end of the crisis, capital returned to the Latin
American countries and the nature of financing
changed, as bonds replaced loans. With the outbreak in
1994 of the tequila crisis (triggered in Mexico) the
possible mechanics of an institutional framework for
such situations again became a discussion point. At that
point, a wide range of options were proposed; some
favoured the introduction of collective action clauses
and others the institutionalization of some kind of
scheme of economic and financial reorganization,
principally along the lines of United States bankruptcy
proceedings.
Those in favour of the institutional approach
included Jeffrey Sachs,2  who proposed a bankruptcy
regime of international scope based on chapter 11 of
the United States bankruptcy law. The idea was to set
up a legal framework which would give governments
temporary support to renegotiate with their creditors
before the respective lawsuits were brought.
Advocates of the market stance argued in favour
of the conflict being worked out between the contracting
parties (the sovereign debtor and the creditors), without
the intervention of third parties (an arbiter such as IMF
or another international agency). But, admitting the
impossibility of arriving at an agreement that would
satisfy all of the bondholders, many academics and
policymakers3  began to consider it advisable to devise
some kind of clause that would enable the majority
group of bondholders to renegotiate with the sovereign
debtor.4  This was resolved with the introduction of a
collective action clause, which reduced the power of
creditors, known as holdouts, who opted not to
participate in the renegotiation.
However, the toughest creditors deemed this
alternative non-viable, on the grounds that any kind of
clause that broke the unanimity conditions would
represent an erosion of their rights.
This was the point the debate had reached when it
was interrupted by two developments in 2001. First,
was the entry to office of the Government of George
W. Bush,5  which was to play a strong role in the later
debate, in the United States. Second, the situation in
Argentina continued to worsen, and default began to
appear inevitable.
These developments led the new Chief Economist
of IMF, Anne Krueger, to propose the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). This mechanism was
based on United States bankruptcy law and included
elements of two chapters of this legislation: chapter 11
on corporations and chapter 9 on municipalities. The
most salient aspects of the proposal referred to increased
Fund involvement in bankruptcy administration and the
establishment of a new institution, the Sovereign Debt
Dispute Resolution Forum (SDDRF), to oversee the
process of sovereign bankruptcy.
Not surprisingly, this scheme met with the
disapprobation of the financial community, which felt
that crises should be worked out by the market and that
debtors’ leverage should be kept to a minimum. This
was the position adopted by the Institute of International
Finance (IIF, 1999; 2001), which viewed even temporary
attempts to defer debt payment or any other avenue
leading to arrears as illegitimate.
At the same time, the United States Secretary of
the Treasury was insisting on letting the market have a
stronger influence and, paradoxical though it may seem,
suggested that at some point investors would have to
2 See Sachs (1995).
3 The proposal was backed at the academic level by Eichengreen,
Portes and others (1995) and at the government level by a report of
the Group of Ten (G-10) (1996).
4 As occurs in the case of bonds issued under the jurisdiction of
London.
5 The presidential changeover also implied the replacement of Larry
Summers and Stanley Fischer, of the United States Treasury
Department and IMF, respectively, by R. Taylor and Anne Krueger.
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assume their part in the settlement of the dispute.6  This
new stance brought into play five new principles that
were supposed to steer the resolution of the crisis
(Machinea, 2002, pp. 31-32): (i) that this resolution
would not imply a write-down in the liabilities of debtor
countries; (ii) that creditors would not believe that
official assistance would protect them from moral
hazard; (iii) that private sector engagement could help
to reduce the public sector’s borrowing needs; (iv) that,
as far as possible, private sector involvement should
take the form of voluntary schemes agreed upon
between debtors and creditors; and (v) that no category
of private debt should be afforded special treatment.
These guidelines would be applied on a case-by-case
basis and IMF would work out the details.
Thus the debate ended up leaning more towards a
market solution, pushing the relevant international
agency, IMF, into a less influential role. Argentina was
lined up to be the first country to deal with its debt
crisis under this new approach. However, given the
failure to define a renegotiation scheme and the lack of
leading role for the Fund, Argentina ultimately crafted
its own solution for the debt swap.
2. Convertibility in Argentina: origins and crisis
The launch of the convertibility plan in March 1991,
under the Convertibility Law, enabled Menem’s
Government to stabilize the economy after the chaos
that followed the debt crisis of the 1980s, with the
introduction of a fixed one-to-one dollar-peso exchange
rate. Although this was costly in economic policy terms,
it soon gained broad acceptance. The fact that the
convertibility regime effectively tied the hands of
policymakers in fiscal and monetary matters enhanced
Argentina’s credibility vis-à-vis external creditors and
multilateral institutions.
More or less simultaneously, Argentina moved
ahead with an ambitious programme of privatizations
and launched a process of financial and trade
deregulation and liberalization. The privatizations soon
became one of the pillars of the new economic
programme. From an aggregate point of view, the sale
of public assets and the use of the debt-capitalization
scheme (UNCTC, 1990, p. 85) enabled Argentina to attract
fresh FDI, reduce its external debt and remove the
financial liabilities generated by public utilities from
the public sphere. From a microeconomic perspective,
the process was soon to draw criticism for focusing on
a quest for credibility (Gerchunoff and Canovas, 1995),
which would ultimately tie the fate of the privatized
firms to the success of the convertibility plan.
As far as macroeconomic performance goes, the
effects of the plan kicked in quite quickly and
hyperinflation and instability became things of the past.
Inflation dropped impressively and the economy,
fuelled by domestic demand, expanded steadily thanks
to the increase in real wages and the reappearance of
credit, although this generated a trade deficit. But
investment was rising too. Thus the country entered a
solid upward spiral of growth, with the economy
expanding by around 9% per year in 1994, and
productivity increased (Stallings and Peres, 2000,
p. 78). At the same time, public external debt was
trending downwards thanks to Brady bonds.
Argentina thus became catalogued as a fast-track
reformer, winning the support and approbation of the
international financial community and of the
Washington-based international financial institutions
(IMF, World Bank and IDB).
The economy continued on an upward course until
the tequila crisis; but this challenge, too, was quickly
overcome and confidence in the model restored. The
situation began to change in the second half of the
1990s, however, when a series of financial crises broke
out, starting in East Asia. In 1998, the Argentine
economy slipped into a downward spiral towards
depression and crisis.7
3. Declaration of default and renegotiation
of the public debt
Thirty-eight months after the declaration of default, and
with no help whatsoever from IMF, Argentina shed its
defaulted status when its offer was widely accepted (by
over 75%) among bondholders and it achieved what
no country had achieved before: the bondholders not
only accepted a large cut in principal, but agreed to a
lengthening of maturity and a reduction in the interest
rates finally paid. In other restructurings, creditors have
had to accept one of these measures, but Argentina
achieved all three (The Economist, 2005).
6 It was thought that this stance would reduce the problem of moral
hazard, by avoiding international agency resources being used to
lower the risks of private investment in emerging markets.
7 The many causes cited to explain the failure of the convertibility
scheme fall into three main categories: structural reasons, based
on the overvaluation of the exchange rate; fiscal reasons that cite
lack of fiscal discipline on the part of the Government; and
behavioural reasons that point to the role of unrealistic expectations
in triggering the crisis.
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What were the factors that enabled Argentina to
impose a unilateral solution in the process of debt
renegotiation?
To start with, any solution was going to depend on
the Government’s swap proposal, the leverage of each
of the parties and the stances taken by the international
financial institutions and the developed countries in the
renegotiations.
The Government’s proposal was both unilateral and
ambitious. Argentina’s “game plan” could be defined
as non-cooperation (“take it or leave it”), working on
the supposition that the creditors’ bargaining power
would weaken over time. The short-term cost to the
country was minimal, since Argentina clearly had no
possibility of obtaining external financing in the
international financial markets anyway. The additional
resources the Government could access by not paying
its external debt, together with the introduction of new
taxes (withholding tax on exports), the higher level of
economic activity and, probably, improved tax
management, enabled the new leader, President
Kirchner, to adopt a tougher negotiating stance with
creditors.
The offer was all the more unilateral given the
Administration’s patent lack of interest in finding an
interlocutor.8  The Government’s every move was aimed
at preventing the creditors from coordinating with each
other. This implied a course from which there could be
no turning back: from then on, the question was the
level of acceptance the swap could achieve. A high
acceptance level would ensure the operation’s success,
although the move was risky in that a failure would
reunify the bloc of creditors and align them behind the
demand for a new swap proposal. In weighing up the
strategy’s probabilities of success, however, the
Government already had a significant “floor
acceptance”, since around 30% of the debt stock was
held by local financial agents (retirement and pension
funds administrators, insurance companies, institutional
funds, financial entities and so on) whose acceptance
could be taken for granted. Ultimately, the lack of
cohesion among the different organizations
representing the creditors worked to the advantage of
the Government.
The unilateral offer, however was indirectly
supported by the other actors. On the one hand, the
international financial institutions had no hand
whatsoever in the launch of the swap, which was
attributable to the dissension on how to deal with
such situations.9  On the other, the developed
countries did not adopt a unified stance, and the
Government of President Bush has taken a laissez-
faire approach to sovereign crisis resolution
(Roubini, 2005). The non-intervention of IMF together
with the lack of cohesion within the G7 ultimately
benefited the debtor country.
There are also a series of exogenous factors that
ought not to be disregarded. The international economic
situation, associated with low interest rates in the United
States, and the narrowing of emerging bond spreads,
improved the conditions of the offer10  at no cost to
Argentina. It should also be considered that the
Government’s proposal was not far off the bonds’
market value at the time the swap was launched
(Roubini, 2005).
The outcome of the swap far exceeded Argentina’s
expectations. The fact that Argentina worked out its
default unilaterally without the intervention of the
international financial institutions has sent strong
signals to the financial markets. Given the
inoperativeness of these institutions and the existence
of (numerous) creditors and investors keen to teach
Argentina a lesson,11  is the situation salvageable or
will more sovereign debtors follow Argentina’s
“example”?
8 This strategy was later reinforced by the Minister of Economic
Affairs, with the establishment of the floor level of acceptances to
consider the swap a success (50%); the adoption of legislation
preventing the Government from reopening the swap without the
approval of the National Congress, and the stance of not permitting
the involvement of IMF in negotiations with creditors.
9 In addition to this dissension was the fact that IMF would have
had little credibility (mainly vis-à-vis the Argentine Government)
to mediate among the parties (IMF, 2004).
10 By reducing the discount rate used to calculate the offer’s present
value.
11 The success of the unilateral debt swap does not detract from the
fact that Argentina will face serious problems if it attempts to return
to the international financial markets. In addition, the discounted
external private debt still represents a heavy financial burden that
the country will have to begin to pay in the future. As Argentina is
forced to seek external financing, its current bargaining power will
be weakened.
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III
The other crisis: FDI in public utilities
1. Rules or discretionary powers
in the international system
Since the mid-twentieth century, bilateralism has been
growing in strength as it became increasingly difficult
to arrive at a multilateral consensus on the degree of
protection that ought to be afforded to FDI. After the
end of the Second World War, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment (1948) was held
with a view to setting up an “international trade
organization” (ITO), which would deal with all matters
of trade and investment. The Conference arrived at an
agreement only on trade matters, however, and this was
set out in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). The issue of investment attracted scant interest
until the start of the Uruguay Round (1982), when the
countries began to debate the process of strengthening
foreign investment. This led to a series of partial
multilateral agreements on trade-related investment
measures (TRIMs), trade in services (GATS), a special
energy agreement known as the Energy Chapter12  and
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPs). Any attempt to introduce some sort of agreement
on investment was doomed to failure, however, as
evidenced by the multilateral agreement on investment
(MAI) initiative launched by OECD and later attempts in
the framework of WTO (the Singapore Declaration and
the Doha Ministerial Declaration).
The process of economic and political
transformation that began in the 1980s and deepened
in the 1990s thus led to the signature of numerous
bilateral investment agreements, and use of the bilateral
scheme became widespread.
The success of the bilateral scheme does not refute
the proposal of Kydland and Prescott (1977) on the
advisability of establishing rules of economic policy,
instead of leaving it to be handled on a discretionary
basis. This is particularly relevant in the case of
investment because, unlike trade flows, investments
have important consequences for the future, which
makes them more vulnerable to opportunistic moves
on the part of governments.13  This point is even more
important when inbound FDI is going to public utilities,
in which the intertemporal natural of the problem is
made more acute by the State’s role in regulating rates,
investments and service quality. In this case,
discretionary administrative jurisdiction or
governmental opportunism can be serious matters and
the lack of contractual commitments can prompt firms
to reduce or even, in the most extreme cases, suspend
their investments. To avoid this kind of situation, the
Argentine Government established rules and guarantees
as a way of limiting its own manoeuvring room to alter
contracts.14
Rules on investors’ rights were adopted implicitly
by signing bilateral investment agreements and through
membership of international institutions whose purpose
it is to settle disputes between investor and State (ICSID
or similar bodies). The bilateral scheme gathered
tremendous momentum, and the number of bilateral
agreements jumped from less than 400 in 1989 to 2,392
in 2004, of which 70% were operational (UNCTAD,
2005a). As for ICSID, from having five outstanding cases
representing US$ 15 million a decade ago, the Centre
now has 113 cases worth US$ 30 billion (Dañino, 2005).
Certain rules did become harmonized in the
framework of the bilateral scheme as it gathered
strength, but it had a number of disadvantages with
respect to the multilateral system. Without a doubt, the
benefits of such schemes leaned heavily towards the
investors, who used them to secure important
guarantees. For capital-exporting countries, the bilateral
scheme facilitated and protected outward investments
by native firms and became a channel for introducing
greater demands (Moltke and Mann, 2004).
The bilateral scheme had its advantages for FDI host
countries, since the start-up of such regimes sent a
positive signal to foreign investors. Its effectiveness,
however, was subsequently to be called into question.
12 A multilateral agreement devised to encourage private-sector
engagement in the energy sector in the former Soviet republics.
13 Opportunism arises because of the intertemporal nature of the
relationship, since the government may be tempted to change the
rules set at the start.
14 The more comprehensive the contract extended, the greater
the Government’s commitment to non-renegotiation.
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An econometric study (UNCTAD, 1998) found that
no causal relationship existed between FDI flows and
the signature of bilateral investment agreements.15
Hallward-Driemeier (2003) found that the examination
of FDI flows from developed countries did not sustain
the conclusion that higher protection acted as a pull
factor for additional investment. This author found that
the choice of investment location continued to be driven
by factors such as market size, strategic reasons or
natural resource endowments. With respect to United
States investments, Sullivan (2003) concludes that the
bilateral protection agreement framework has little
bearing on investment location decisions.16  Tobin and
Rose-Ackerman (2003) examined the contribution of
bilateral investment agreements to well-being and
concluded that the effect was at best ambiguous, since
such agreements could not only be harmful in terms of
flexibility but could also end up benefiting the foreign
investors over the population at large. Ultimately, the
studies cited call into question the hypothesis that
increased protection always brings greater inflows of
FDI and signal that, conversely, they impose very
significant international commitments on the recipient
countries.
The advantages for host countries wane even more
in view of the pro-investor bias that this type of scheme
tends to build up in terms of investors’ rights and
guarantees against expropriation, especially of the
“indirect” variety. This trend is evident in new bilateral
investment agreements which are ever broader in scope
and impose increasingly large constraints on
government action. Foreign investors also have an
advantage when it comes to assessing whether a
particular government measure may be considered
expropriatory, leading firms to “defy” attempts to alter
existing laws and regulations (Stanley, 2004). This
phenomenon is beginning to be examined after
widespread complaints in the framework of NAFTA17  and
is now spreading into other jurisdictions (Moltke and
Mann, 2004; Peterson, 2004).18
These considerations lead to the conclusion that
the bilateral investment agreement scheme can be
detrimental in certain circumstances. Investor’s rights
have gained so much ground that they risk causing
disproportionate costs in the recipient countries.
2. The Argentine crisis and FDI
The abrupt end of exchange rate parity opened a new
front in the dispute with foreign investors, now with
those who had invested in the real sector, especially
public utilities. Under the agreements signed in the
1990s, investors felt that they were entitled to full
compensation from the Government. Although most
investors in Argentina were affected by the change in
the exchange rate model, the bulk of the complaints
came from those with some kind of interest in public
utilities, mainly those associated with the energy
industry (gas and electric power).19
The predominance of this type of investment was
due not only to the guarantees offered under the new
bilateral scheme (such as the mechanism for settling
disputes between the State and the investor), but also
the provision of national regulations (for example, rates
set in dollars and indexed to the United States wholesale
price index). The contractual framework consisted of
legislative provisions, regulatory terms and agreements
reached with third countries through bilateral
investment schemes guaranteed in an independent
international legal framework (ICSID or other arbitration
tribunal). Thus, seeking to ensure the arrival of investors
and the success of the scheme, the Government ended
up by accepting a system of “complete” contracts,
thereby accepting risks that did not correspond to it.
This mechanism helped the Argentine Government
to demonstrate its commitment to international
standards, but it also became the main shield behind
which foreign investors started legal proceedings. The
15 According to UNCTAD, agreements play a minor role in defining
the destination of FDI flows, although this role may be more
important in certain circumstances.
16 Eighty percent of United States FDI goes to three countries
(Mexico, China and Brazil) with which the United States has not
signed any special investment protection agreement, except in the
context of NAFTA, which Mexico also signed.
17 The health and environment sectors are among the worst affected,
because of firms pressuring the State not to alter the original rules.
The threat of legal action imposes a constraint known as regulatory
chill on the capacity to regulate. This was among the phenomena
that gave rise to a debate on Chapter XI of NAFTA.
18 Basically because of the new bilateral investment agreements
launched by the United States. The papers cited discuss the cases
of South Africa and Malaysia, whose respective Governments have
encountered strong resistance –on the part of foreign investors– to
the introduction of programmes aimed at racial or ethnic equality.
19 According to the International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD), bondholders not included in the Argentine
Government’s debt swap and organized by the Global Committee
of Argentine Bondholders planned to bring the Government of
Argentina to arbitration proceedings based on investment
agreements (IIDS, 2005).
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spirit of the restrictions the Government had imposed
upon itself (the legislation combined with the
agreements) was to minimize the possibility of contract
renegotiation with privatized firms, since the magnitude
of the commitments made any alteration, however
necessary, too costly. Ultimately, the crisis was to
demonstrate the intrinsic “incompleteness” of the
contract scheme implicit in the regulation of the
privatized firms (Guash, Laffont and Straub, 2002;
Navajas, 2004). As successive Administrations proved
reluctant to abide by the terms of the contracts signed,
a number of investors began to withdraw –this may have
been the case of the French firms EdF and France
Telecom and National Grid of the United Kindgom–
and investments were confined to those needed to
maintain quality of service.
This divergence prompted a torrent of suits before
ICSID. Argentina is currently facing 42 lawsuits,20
including four brought before the United Nations Centre
for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),21  which raise
the country’s contingent liabilities by around US$ 20
billion. This amount could rise considerably if a series
of potential suits before ICSID prosper.22
The measures adopted by the Government affected
the economic and financial equation for investors. In
the case of the regulated sectors (with pesified rates),
the higher the level of indebtedness in dollars, the larger
the impact of the measures. Hence, regardless of the
sector, most of the disputes brought after 2002 cited
the effects of the devaluation on contracts in general
and on the rate-setting system in particular. Investors
maintained that the Government of Argentina had
agreed to assume the exchange-rate risk then broke this
promise in January 2002.
Some of the most vigourous presentations came
from regulated firms belonging to the energy sector (gas
and electric power), which initiated 22 lawsuits (19
before ICSID and three before UNCITRAL). Given the
strong vertical and horizontal that exists in those
industries, the firms’ complaints referred not only to
the effects of the economic emergency law on rates,
through pesification and rate freezes, but also to the
effects on prices in the unregulated sector (in the case
of gas, the price of inputs; in the case of electricity, the
price of generation). Another group of plaintiffs in the
regulated sector consisted of mainly French (five of a
total of eight suits) investors with interests in the
provision of drinking water and sanitation. A third group
of cases were initiated by investors with telecoms
operations (Telefónica S.A. of Spain and France
Telecom S.A.). Yet another group of complaints were
lodged by foreign investors who had some kind of
contract with the public administration, who sued the
State for breach of contract.23  And one last of group of
six suits involved firms that had no link whatsoever
with the Government, who sued the country over the
impact of the devaluation on their liabilities.
Although most of the cases cited more than one
cause, pesification was the primary motivation for the
lawsuits brought against Argentina (Stanley, 2004).
Whatever the reasons signalled, however, the filing of
cases was generally a strategic move in the positioning
for renegotiation. Hence, after the economic emergency
legislation was passed and the lawsuits filed, there
ensued a wrangle between the Argentine Government,
the foreign investors (mainly those with interests in the
private sectors) and the international financial
institutions (World Bank and IMF).
The Argentine response may be succinctly
described as a sort of impeachment of the entire global
system. Through the procurator of the treasury, the
Government began by challenging the tribunal,
questioning its transparency, the process by which the
arbitration panel was selected and the fact that the
investors were allowed to engage in forum shopping,
i.e. select the tribunal most likely to provide a favourable
judgment. By the same token, Argentina rejected the
intervention of ICSID (by not recognizing its
jurisdiction), claiming that cases should be heard, at
least, in the local courts first. Lastly, in mounting a
defence –the defence actually formulated in the case
of CMS Gas Transmission Company and the denial of
jurisdiction in others– the Government’s strategy was
to deny that the steps it had taken after declaring the
economic emergency, i.e., pesification and rate freezes,
amounted to expropriation.24  Since all the suits cited a
20 It should be mentioned that five of these were filed while the
convertibility regime was still in place.
21 See UNCTAD (2005b).
22 See El cronista comercial (2005).
23 These may be described as eminently defensive, since they
arose as a consequence of a contractual breach, but with contracts
that were strongly questioned (three cases). At the threat of
becoming tied up in a legal battle with the Government, the
investor brings a case before ICSID or some other arbitration
tribunal with the aim of negotiating with the host country to
drop the original suit.
24 See the list of cases against Argentina brought before ICSID in
annex.
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single cause, the effect of the economic emergency
legislation was central to the Government’s strategy.
The Government argued that the measures it had taken
represented the only avenue open to it and the investors
had to bear part of the adjustment burden. In Argentina’s
favour, it must be said that voices have recently been
raised in a number of academic and political circles,
expressing exactly the same reservations about the
arbitration scheme.25  On the other hand, the delay in
renegotiating contracts with privatized companies
worked against Argentina, by annoying those investors
willing to cede part or all of their claims.26  This is likely
to keep inflows of FDI below their potential level for a
long time.
With its proposals rejected and its arguments
disallowed, the Government shifted its stance. One of
its lines of approach was to seek to have the privatized
firms withdraw their suits as a goodwill gesture in view
of the contract renegotiation. With this in mind, the
Argentine Administration lobbied the Governments of
Spain and France, requesting them to intercede with
their investors, thereby politicizing the lawsuits.
Another, in view of the arbitration tribunal’s award in
the CMS case, was the Government’s suggestion that it
might disacknowledge any possible awards.
The responses from investors varied, depending
on the strategic interest that each had at the point of
filing the original claim. One group, consisting mainly
of investors who still had strategic interests in the
country, began to weigh up the benefits of withdrawing
their suits.27  Those firms that had withdrawn from the
country (investors in public utilities) and those who had
sued as a defensive response, i.e., investors who claimed
breach of contract, appeared likely to continue with their
legal proceedings.
The international financial institutions were fairly
unresponsive to Argentina’s arguments. Immediately
after the crisis, the World Bank attempted to make a
loan conditional upon renegotiation of the rates set in
public utility contracts. The slow reaction of ICSID and
its lack of definition of whether the Governments’
measures were expropriatory or not created uncertainty,
at least during the period when FMI was attempting to
pressure Argentina. In response to this pressure, the
Argentine Government prepaid all its outstanding Fund
loans early (US$ 9 billion).
Regardless of the stances and strategies of the
players, the Argentine case revealed the inadequacy of
the scheme that exists under the auspices of the World
Bank for settling disputes between investors and host
countries. With Argentina accounting for over 40% of
cases pending resolution before ICSID, the problem has
shifted to the door of the arbitration scheme, not the sued
country. Legally speaking, the case showed up the
inappropriateness of a system that prevents collective
action even though most of the suits against Argentina
cite the same cause (contract breaches following the
collapse of the convertibility scheme). This means that
Argentina could find itself the subject of 40 different
and possibly contradictory rulings (Goldhaber, 2004).
25 See IISD/WWF (2001), Mann and von Moltke (2002), Peterson
(2003) and OECD (2005a).
26 This point was also mentioned in the award handed down in the
CMS case (ICSID, 2005).
27 The suits dropped include, reportedly, those filed by: Empresa
Distribuidora y Comercializadora Sur S.A. (EDESUR), AES
Corporation, Pioneer National Resources Co., Camuzzi, Gas
Natural BAN, Empresa Distribuidora y Comercializadora Norte S.A.
(EDENOR) and Unysis, which would lower the total amount claimed
by over US$ 4 billion (El cronista comercial, 2006).
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Conclusions
The vagaries of the relationship between foreign
investors and host countries have sometimes favoured
the former, with examples being international rules that
increase guarantees and legal certainty and the MAI
initiative launched in the framework of OECD, and
sometimes the latter, exemplified by inaction in
response to the wave of nationalizations in the 1970s
and the subsequent attempt to establish a code of
conduct for TNCs in the framework of the United Nations.
In the 1990s, the balance tipped excessively towards
foreign investors.
Before the Argentine crisis, foreign investors had
managed to enhance the guarantees and legal certainty
that developing countries and transition economies
provided, by introducing into their contracts with
debtors a series of clauses waiving sovereign immunity
in the case of default (as the transnational banks had
done in the 1970s under the syndicated loan system).
Foreign investors’ guarantees and advantages were then
further expanded as the bilateral scheme became more
widespread and a dispute settlement mechanism was
introduced enabling them to sue the host country
directly.
When the Argentine crisis broke out, however, the
international system failed to provide a solution to either
the sovereign default or the losses of foreign investors
caused by the country’s refusal to apply the rates
stipulated in the original contract. The bondholders
were horrified to find that IMF was unable to force the
Argentine Government to renegotiate its debt under any
kind of preexisting scheme or provide assistance to
bondholders who opted not to accept the swap offer
–holdouts– in the hope of a better proposal from the
Government of Argentina. Foreign investors were
equally shocked to find that the World Bank was unable
to oblige the Argentine authorities to abide by the
original terms of utility contracts. For its part, the
Argentine Government, in its dual capacity as debtor
and host country, was also appalled by the functioning
of the international system, because of the way it
explicitly favoured foreign investors, the lack of
objectivity of the international financial institutions
(basically IMF) and attempts to condition the country’s
economic policy to fulfilment of international
commitments. As a result, and in view of the social
dimension of the crisis,28  the Government found itself
forced to choose between using resources to alleviate
the social suffering caused by the crisis and allocating
them to its international obligations to foreign investors.
Ultimately, the international financial system failed to
provide the Government of Argentina with specific
solutions to resolve the multiple crises the country was
facing.
The foregoing leads to consideration of the main
lessons of Argentine case with respect to the existing
institutional system. First, the solutions proposed are
highly asymmetric, since they are heavily biased
towards one of the parties –investor or host country–
and lack long-term viability. Foreign investor’s interest
in securing guarantees through some type of market
solutions or through bilateral investment agreements
(or, more recently, through investment chapters in free
trade agreements) does not seem, given its strong bias,
an adequate solution to the problems associated with
severe crisis. The new approach adopted by the United
States Administration and IMF to dealing with financial
crisis failed to offer a solution or protection to investors
and paves the way for unilateral initiatives like that
piloted by Argentina.
With respect to the treatment of investment, thus
far all attempts to establish a multilateral scheme have
failed to prosper because of differences of opinion
within the bloc of investing countries. The notions
underpinning those attempts are, in any case, no longer
really relevant today if the idea is to solve the world’s
real problems. It is time to rethink the relationship
between foreign investors and host countries, in order
to arrive at an equitable and lasting multilateral scheme.
With a view to this, an interesting starting point could
be the recent initiative of OECD (OECD, 2005b) which
rejects the previous approach (MAI) as intrusive and
authoritarian towards developing countries.
Second, the recent Argentine experience suggests
that, in the event of a multiple crisis, democratic
governments will put the needs of their electorate before
the demands of foreign investors. To suppose that
28 Between 1999 and 2003 the proportion of Argentines living below
the poverty line doubled, from 27.1 to 54.7% pf the population.
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strengthening the bilateral scheme will afford foreign
investors more continuous guarantees and legal
protection is to forget that multilateral negotiations are
the only framework available to developing countries
and transition economies in which to bargain. Although
thus far no multilateral agreement has been reached
for the settlement of financial crises or investment
disputes, the multilateral principle remains the best
option for developing countries, because of the benefits
in terms of equity, and for external investors, because
it is more predictable. In the long term, it may also
mean greater credibility.
Lastly, it may be asked whether in the Argentine
case the protection extended to foreign investors
ultimately worked against them, by forcing them to
accept the conditions offered by the Government of
Argentina. Even if this was not the case, it may become
so in the medium term.29  Questions are increasingly
being raised over the bias that international financial
institutions show towards foreign investors without
providing concrete solutions to developing countries
in the event of financial crisis or investment disputes,
the latter of which are becoming more and more
common. Disenchantment with these institutions is one
of the many manifestations of mounting doubt with
regard to the market-based adjustment models
implemented in Latin America in the 1990s, which were
excessively market-biased and limited in their benefits.
(Original: Spanish)
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